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This paper proposes a theory in which informational failures hindering an e¢ cient
operation of the economy are solved over the course development. Individuals are
heterogeneous in terms of entrepreneurial talent, exhibiting di⁄erent comparative
advantages. Talent is subject to private information, giving rise to adverse selec-
tion problems. In this paper, adverse selection stems from sectors scarcity, which
prevents some individuals from ￿nding their "appropriate" sector. The availability
of many sectors facilitates the allocation of individuals￿unobservable talent. As a
result, sectors expansion fosters growth because it helps to solve adverse selection
problems. Successful long-run development is characterised by a continuous process
of sectoral expansion, improved allocation of talent, and more e¢ cient operation
of ￿nancial institutions. Nevertheless, this model may also lead to poverty-traps;
where economies are con￿ned to a rudimentary situation with few sectors, poor
allocation of talent, and underdeveloped ￿nancial institutions.
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11 Introduction
Over the course of development, the number of economic activities available to agents
tends to increase, along with the aggregate stock of capital and output. In other words,
while turning wealthier, societies not only accumulate larger amounts of capital, but cap-
ital accumulation itself is subject to changes, becoming progressively more di⁄erentiated.
This dynamic pattern means that economic development partly manifests as a process of
sectoral diversi￿cation (or sectoral horizontal expansion), a feature robustly documented
by Imbs and Wacziarg (2003). We argue here that this process of sectoral diversi￿ca-
tion permits a less costly and more e¢ cient allocation of individuals skills, and, as a
consequence of this, an improved operation of a wide set of ￿nancial institutions.
This paper proposes a theory in which informational failures hindering the e¢ cient al-
location of individuals￿talent are endogenously solved during the process of development.
Individuals are heterogeneous in terms of talent or skills concerning di⁄erent economic ac-
tivities, characterised by distinct comparative advantages. However, skills are subject to
asymmetric information, meaning that individuals possess better knowledge about their
own capabilities than the rest of the economy. Given this sort of asymmetric information,
adverse selection problems may naturally arise. In this model, adverse selection stems
from sectors or activities scarcity, which obstructs an e¢ cient allocation of unobservable
talent. We suggest that some agents might be intrinsically gifted to specialise in activities
or sectors that, for some reason, are not feasible or available. The unavailability of their
"appropriate" sector or activity (i.e. the one for which they would enjoy comparative
advantages), leaves those agents with no other choice but to specialise in activities for
which they are not particularly talented. However, asymmetric information concerning
intrinsic skills prevents (ex-ante) e¢ cient screening of heterogeneous agents. As a result of
this, not only those individuals whose "appropriate" sector is absent will su⁄er from this
sectors incompleteness; but also those individuals whose "appropriate" sector actually
exists will be a⁄ected, since they will have to cope with the adverse selection problem. In
other words, those agents who are not really able to exploit their comparative advantages
in￿ ict a negative externality (through the adverse selection problem) on those who, in
principle, would be able to fully exercise their skills.
Historically, variety of sectors has been considered productivity-enhancing, since it per-
mits heterogeneous agents (in terms of skills) to obtain a better individual-sector match.
Notice, however, this matching-e⁄ect is completely independent of the informational struc-
ture of the economy. Our theory claims that sectoral expansion brings about an additional
positive e⁄ect on output and growth, because a larger number of activities helps to miti-
gate adverse selection problems associated to talent allocation.
In our model, adverse selection a⁄ects the operation of the economy because it hampers
full risk-sharing. When individuals are risk-averse, investment in risky activities (entre-
preneurship) will be discouraged by imperfect insurance provision. As a consequence of
this, individuals￿comparative advantages will not be fully exploited, and the economy
will be prevented from reaching a pareto-e¢ cient equilibrium. Agents￿unwillingness to
invest in risky (but highly productive) assets, due to ine¢ cient risk-sharing, is the main
2channel through which adverse selection will contaminate the functioning of the whole
economy in our model.1
The economy modelled in this paper is constituted by many (potential) sectors; each
of them requiring some speci￿c skill. At a particular period of time, some sectors are
available to agents (i.e. some sectors actually exist), while some others are (still) absent.
The creation of a sector is the result of a successful innovation. Innovation activities are
undertaken by private agents who invest in research and development (R&D) and intend
to maximise pro￿ts, in spirit of the Endogenous Growth Theory (Romer (1990), Grossman
and Helpman (1991), Aghion and Howitt (1992)). The availability of many sectors facili-
tates the allocation of individuals talent, without interfering with other sectors. This fact
reduces the severity of the adverse selection problem, enabling better insurance provision;
which, in turn, encourages entrepreneurial activities. At last, vigorous entrepreneurship
enhances the incentives to invest in R&D and innovate, since innovations are ultimately
sold to entrepreneurs, who are the agents that ultimately put them in practise.
In this paper economic development is characterised by a continuous process of capital
di⁄erentiation (sectoral expansion) and a more e¢ cient allocation of skills. In addition to
that, risk-sharing institutions become increasingly e¢ cient over the path of development,
as adverse selection problems tend to vanish away concomitantly with sectoral expansion.
Nevertheless, our model may also generate a particular type of poverty-trap in which some
economies are con￿ned to an undesirable situation with few active sectors, poor allocation
of individuals talent, and ine¢ cient operation of risk-pooling institutions.
Ghatak, Morelli and Sj￿str￿m (2002) are the ￿rst authors to explicitly model misal-
location of entrepreneurial talent as a consequence of an insu¢ ciently attractive outside
option available to the "wrong" types (i.e. those individuals who lack of entrepreneurial
skills). In their model, the outside option available to agents who lack of entrepreneurial
skills is the market wage. When the economy is able to provide high wages, low-quality
entrepreneurs are better-o⁄ selling their work-force in the labour market. As a result,
high wages help to "clean" the pool of credit applicants, reducing informational frictions
and enabling better operation of the credit market.2 Our paper, besides focusing on in-
surance instead of credit, looks at a di⁄erent mechanism as the determinant of an e¢ cient
allocation of talent. We let innovation and the creation of new sectors/activities solve the
adverse selection problem, by permitting individuals to specialise in the task they are best
at. In that sense, one of the main insights of our model is that it concedes the innovation
process a new role, very di⁄erent from the one traditionally stressed in the growth liter-
ature. Innovation is not only desirable because it augments the productivity of inputs.
It is also desirable because, by granting agents the chance to freely allocate their skills
where they are most productive, it mitigates informational problems interfering with the
1The claim that engaging in risky projects requires e¢ cient risk-sharing institutions that protect from
bad states of nature goes back to Arrow (1971). For some papers where that idea is incorporated into
growth models, see Saint-Paul (1992) and Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997).
2Gr￿ner (2003) also provides a model where entrepreneurial skills are more e¢ ciently allocated in
richer, or less unequal, economies. However, in his model there is no interaction between di⁄erent
markets, and his results are driven by a pure "wealth-e⁄ect" that arises due to limited liability issues.
3operation of the entire economy.
Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1999) also build a theory in which the quality of available
information improves during the process of development. However, their motivation and
object of study is completely di⁄erent from ours. They are interested in how a society
can provide correct incentives to agents, so that to solve moral hazard problems. They
argue that, as an economy grows, each sector receives higher levels of capital, and this
permits a more accurate use of relative performance evaluation schemes by repeating
the same task. They do not study how the allocation of di⁄erent skills evolves during
development. Furthermore, they do not incorporate innovation decisions into their theory,
which precludes the number of di⁄erent economic activities from expanding along time.
In another paper, Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) construct a model where the degree
of market incompleteness tends to disappear with capital accumulation, and sectoral
di⁄erentiation enables better risk-sharing. Nonetheless, this model does not deal with
the problem of skills allocation of heterogeneous agents and adverse selection. Insurance
provision is enhanced with sectors horizontal expansion, simply because this allows better
pooling of sector-speci￿c shocks; while in ours it is the consequence of the amelioration of
informational failures due to improvements in the skills allocation technology. In addition,
the reason underlying their market incompleteness relates to indivisibilities (added to
capital scarcity in poor nations). We do not need to rely on production non-convexities,
deriving insurance under-provision from a standard asymmetric information problem.
The present paper is also related to the literature about credit market imperfections
and poverty: Galor and Zeira (1993), Banerjee and Newman (1993), Piketty (1997),
Aghion and Bolton (1997), and Lloyds-Ellis and Bernhardt (2000). These papers stress
the importance of the initial-wealth distribution over the dynamic behaviour of the econ-
omy when agency-costs lead to credit rationing. As a general result, their models com-
monly lead to poverty-traps when the number of poor agents is large enough. Our theory
contributes to this literature by di⁄erent channels. We ￿rst provide a fully micro-founded
explanation of why agency-costs may arise. Secondly, our paper is able to produce dynam-
ics where these agency-costs are reduced as an economy develops. As a result, rationing is
not just solved because people become rich enough (so that they can a⁄ord better credit
or insurance contracts), but mainly because ￿nancial markets are able to function better.
1.1 Empirical Motivation and Some Stylised Facts
One of the fundamental observations that motivates our theory is the fact that economic
development and the degree of sectoral diversi￿cation have historically displayed signi￿-
cant positive correlation. This correlation re￿ ects our idea that the number of economic
activities in which individuals can specialise grows simultaneously with the aggregate
stock of capital and income.
Imbs and Wacziarg (2003), making use of non-parametric techniques, provide strong
and robust evidence that sectoral concentration (the opposite to sectoral diversi￿cation)
follows a "U-shaped" pattern as the aggregate income level rises.3 They conclude that,
3Imbs and Wacziarg build ￿ve di⁄erent concentration indices based on employment shares (these in-
4over the path of development, poor countries initially experience a long process of sectoral
di⁄erentiation, and this diversi￿cation pattern eventually reaches a maximum beyond
which the process begins to revert. Given the implications of our paper, two observations
need to be stressed here: (i) the "turning-point" in the sectoral di⁄erentiation process
occurs at relatively high output levels (the authors argue that this point is located roughly
at the real income level reached by Ireland in 1992), (ii) the eventual re-concentration
process does only partly o⁄set the e⁄ect of the initial diversi￿cation phase.
Figure 1 presents Figure 1 and 2 of Imbs and Wacziarg (2003). Panel (a) shows
the non-parametric estimation when sectoral concentration is measured by the gini co-
e¢ cient calculated using the 3-digit UNIDO employment data. Panel (b) displays the
non-parametric results when 1-digit ILO employment data is used with the analogous
purpose. Income is measured by income per-capita PPP in 1985 constant US dollars.
Both ￿gures show how sectoral concentration decreases at initial stages of development,
eventually reaching a turning-point beyond which the initial diversi￿cation phase partially
reverts.
Figure 1 : Estimated Association Between Sectoral
Diversi￿cation and Income Level.
(a) (b)
Our model also highlights the key role of ￿nancial development, through its positive
e⁄ect on entrepreneurial investment and output growth. This relation between ￿nan-
cial development and output/investment is long established and well documented in the
literature: King and Levine (1993a, 1993b), Atje and Jovanovic (1993), and Benhabib
dices are: Gini coe¢ cient, Her￿ndahl index, log-variance of sector shares, coe¢ cient of variation, and the
max-min spread). Their indices are constructed for three di⁄erent datasets: 1-digit level from the Inter-
national Labor O¢ ce (ILO), 3-digit level United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO),
and 2-digit level data from the OECD. For the UNIDO and OECD data, value added per sector are also
available and utilised. All their results are strongly robust to the use of di⁄erent indices and datasets.
5and Spiegel (2000). Our theory particularly stresses the importance of e¢ cient insurance
schemes as a condition for entrepreneurial investment; this view is supported by Atje and
Jovanovic (1993). They ￿nd evidence that the ratio of annual value of all stock market
trades to GDP signi￿cantly increases the average return on investment, but the ratio of
credit extended by banks to GDP does not seem to have any e⁄ect on that variable. Given
that stock markets are better suited to diversifying idiosyncratic risks than lending in-
stitutions; their results may be interpreted as con￿rmation that investors do respond to
the availability of improved insurance services, by shifting to riskier and more productive
investment projects.
Closely related to issue to ￿nancial development and growth, we ￿nd the observation
that income variability and output are negatively correlated. Section II in Acemoglu and
Zilibotti (1997) thoroughly goes through several pieces of both recent and historical ev-
idence of this fact. Ramey and Ramey (1995) show that ￿countries with higher output
volatility have lower mean growth, even after controlling for other observables and for
country-￿xed e⁄ects￿ . Surprisingly, they show the negative e⁄ect of volatility on output
does not seem to work through investment. This result quite contradicts the spirit of one
of the main motivations of this paper; the fact that the incapacity to smooth out shocks
may discourage entrepreneurial investment. However, Aizenman and Marion (1999) es-
timate the e⁄ect of volatility on investment, disaggregating between private and public
investment for a sample of 43 developing countries. In opposition to Ramey and Ramey
(who only utilise aggregate investment), they ￿nd a very strong and signi￿cant negative
e⁄ect of volatility on private investment. On the other hand, when they look at public
investment, it turns out that the e⁄ect volatility is positive in this case (which seems to
explain the absence of any signi￿cant relation between volatility and total investment in
Ramey and Ramey (1995)).
Finally, a fundamental prediction of our theory is that the degree of sectoral diversi￿-
cation has a positive e⁄ect on ￿nancial development. In particular, this paper argues that
higher degree of sectoral diversi￿cation permits more e¢ cient insurance provision, since it
helps to solve adverse selection problems. This e⁄ect has neither been studied before, nor
has it been incorporated into any theoretical model in the existing development litera-
ture. After we present and develop the model that illustrates our theory (in the following
4 sections), we will provide some evidence which is consistent with this prediction of the
model. In any case, the reader can look at Tables 1 and 2 in Section 6, if he or she wishes
to have an earlier look at these data.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the basic set-up of the model.
Section 3 presents the behaviour of the individuals/entrepreneurs, emphasizing how ad-
verse selection problems a⁄ect their optimal portfolio allocations. Section 4 introduces the
innovation activities into the model, which endogenises the number of sectors available in
the economy. Section 5 proceeds to the dynamic study of this economy. Section 6 shows
some additional descriptive evidence consistent with the model￿ s key predictions. Section
7 concludes with some further discussion.
62 Environment
We consider an economy in which goods production is organised by small and independent
entrepreneurs. Life evolves during the time horizon t = f1;2;:::;1g. The economy enjoys
full access to international credit markets, and is constituted by three di⁄erent kinds of
agents:
1. Entrepreneurs: These agents organise the ￿nal-goods production process. We will
also refer to them simply as individuals.
2. Insurance Companies: They issue and sell insurance contracts that protect from
entrepreneurial failure.
3. Innovators: They carry out R&D in order to transform basic knowledge into knowl-
edge applicable to the production of goods. Innovations expand the number of
sectors or activities available in the economy (horizontal innovations).
This economy is composed by a continuum of sectors indexed by the letter i along
the interval [0;1]. In addition to these sectors, there exists a continuum of villages also
indexed by i along the interval [0;1]. Each village i 2 [0;1] is inhabited by an Entrepreneur
of Type-i, to whom we will also refer simply as a Type-i. Insurers and innovators live
outside these villages, in some piece of common-land located within the boundaries of
the economy. Credit markets are perfect and subject to international capital mobility, so
everybody can lend and borrow as much as desired at the given international interest rate
r = 0.
At the beginning of t = 1 this economy "inherits" some degree of market incom-
pleteness from the previous period t = 0.4 More precisely, during t = 0 only a fraction
n0 2 (0;1) of all sectors were able to enjoy the activity of productive industries. At the
same time, the remaining fraction (1￿n0) lacked of any active industry whatsoever. The
degree of market incompleteness in period t could be then measured by 1 ￿ nt. We will
denote the set of sectors with active industries in period t by At ￿ [0;1]. We work under
the assumption that the availability of productive industries is always the result of hori-
zontal innovations (either during the past or in the present). Once a sector is created, it
does never disappear (i.e. if sector i 2 At, then sector i 2 At+4 8￿ ￿ 1). Therefore, the
set At is determined by the "inherited" set At￿1 (the old sectors), plus the new sectors
resulting from horizontal innovations during period t (the set of new sectors is given by
At \ Ac
t￿1). To ease notation, hereafter we skip the use of time-subscripts when creating
no confusion. We will refer to those sectors belonging to A as active sectors, while those
sectors that do not pertain to A will be denoted inactive sectors.
4We abuse a bit of the language here, and we use the term market incompleteness to refer to sectors
incompleteness (or, which would be exactly the same in this model, ￿nal-goods market incompleteness).
72.1 Technology
A sector i 2 A provides individuals the chance to invest in an entrepreneurial project
called Project-i. The return of Project-i is random, and depends on the realisation of a
purely idiosyncratic shock. For simplicity, we suppose there are only two states of nature:
good (success) and bad (failure). Denote by K the amount of physical capital invested
in the entrepreneurial project (imagine K as machinery, or any sort of physical capital
measured in a common scale). If an individual invests K units of capital in Project-i,
then, after the state of nature is revealed, this individual obtains:
in good state of nature (success): F(K) + (1 ￿ ￿)P K
in bad state of nature (failure): (1 ￿ ￿)P K
Where ￿ 2 (0;1) represents the depreciation rate of K during one period, and P is the
price of each unit of K; therefore, (1 ￿ ￿)P K equals the residual value of the physical
capital purchased at the beginning of the period. We suppose:
F(K) = ￿K
￿ where: ￿ 2 (0;1) and ￿ > 0
2.2 Agents
Entrepreneurs: All individuals live just for one period, let￿ s say t, which lasts from
t￿ till t+. A new generation of individuals is born at the very end of period t. Each
individual procreates 1 son, hence population remains constant across time. Individuals
are warm-glow altruistic -see Andreoni (1989)- and, accordingly, leave positive bequests
(bt+1) to the next generation. Agents￿decision timing is elicited below:
Figure 2: Individuals Decision Timing
t￿ t+
j￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ j￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ j￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ j
agent receives portfolio portfolio consumption (ct) and
bequest bt decisions returns bequests (bt+1) decision
Consumption (ct) and bequests (bt+1) occur at the end of period t (t+), and they
are subject to uncertainty due to the stochasticity of the agent￿ s portfolio returns. In
principle, any individual would be able to transform his initial endowments into resources
for future consumption and bequests by two di⁄erent means: 1) investing in a risky project
(i.e. becoming an entrepreneur); or 2) storing wealth at the given international interest
rate r = 0 (i.e. gross return is 1 + r = 1). Diversi￿cation among entrepreneurial projects
is not feasible; in other words, agents must specialise in one particular project.




t+1)], where   ￿ [￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)1￿￿]
￿1
and ￿ 2 (0;1): The variable ct represents "generation-t" agent consumption, and bt+1
stands for the amount bequeathed to the next generation (his o⁄spring). In addition,
u0(￿) > 0 and u00(￿) < 0. Given this formulation, by denoting end-of-period-wealth in t
8by yt, it can be shown that expected utility maximisation leads to c￿
t = ￿yt and b￿
t+1 =
(1 ￿ ￿)yt.5 As a result, we can simply re-formulate the individual￿ s expected utility as




t+1)] = E[u(yt)]. For the rest of the paper, we work with a utility









t+1) ) u(yt) = ￿exp(￿yt)
Where, for simplicity, it has been assumed that the coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion is
equal to 1. The use of CARA preferences is motivated by the fact that they do not exhibit
"wealth-e⁄ects". As a consequence of that, income distribution will not matter for risky
investment choices. As we will see later on, this fact will allow us to study the e⁄ect of
the number of active sectors on portfolio allocation decisions, in complete isolation from
income distribution issues.6
Recall that each single individual/entrepreneur belongs to a particular type i indexed
along the interval i 2 [0;1]. Let us denote by ￿i;s the failure probability for entrepreneurs
of Type-s 2 [0;1] when investing in Project-i, where by failure is meant the bad state of
nature. Types di⁄er from each other with respect to their comparative skills, in particular:
￿i;i < ￿i;j; for all j 6= i:
In simple words, a Type-i is an individual with intrinsic comparative advantage in Project-
i (of course, as long as this particular project actually exists!). For the sake of analytical
simplicity, it will be supposed that ￿i;j = 1 for all j 6= i, and ￿i;i = ￿ 2 (0;1) for all
i 2 [0;1].
A key assumption in this paper is that individuals￿types are private information.
In other words, there is asymmetric information regarding the entrepreneurs￿skills. In
terms of our speci￿c model, asymmetric information means the place of residence (or
citizenship) of every single individual/entrepreneur is unobservable. In addition to that,
we assume types are genetically uncorrelated, implying that parents￿historical outcomes
provide no information whatsoever about the type of a child.
Insurance Companies: Assume there exists an Arrow-Debreu commodity that pro-
tects from entrepreneurial failure. We suppose there are insurance companies who o⁄er
insurance contracts to entrepreneurs which (in principle) possess the following structure:
1) An Type-j must pay the amount pj ￿ qj to buy qj units of the Arrow-Debreu com-
modity that protect from entrepreneurial failure; 2) once the state of nature is revealed,
if the project has failed (i.e. in the bad state of nature), each unit of Arrow-Debreu
5Notice end-of-period wealth in t (yt) is endogenously determined by the portfolio returns of the
individual (alive during period t).
6In another paper, Jaimovich (2005), I study how "wealth-e⁄ects" a⁄ect agents￿optimal portfolio
allocations when the economy is subject to similar adverse selection problems, utilising a utility func-
tion with constant relative risk aversion (which implies absolute risk aversion is decreasing in wealth).
Succinctly, when absolute risk aversion is decreasing in wealth, poorer agents will su⁄er to a greater
extent the negative consequences of adverse selection problems. Incorporating this e⁄ect would then just
reinforce the results that will be shown in the present paper.
9commodity entitles its owner to 1 unit of ￿nal output as indemnity. Thus, an insurance
contract can be speci￿ed as a pair (pj ;qj) 2 [0;1) ￿ [0;1), with its pay-o⁄ contingent
on entrepreneurial success. It will be supposed that, at the moment of the insurance
contract signing, insurers cannot observe the rest of the individual￿ s portfolio allocation
(i.e., they can neither observe how much an individual has invested in the risk-less asset,
nor how much he has invested in the entrepreneurial project). This last assumption plays
a very important role in the model, since observability of either investment in the risk-less
asset or in the entrepreneurial project would provide insurance companies with valuable
information when trying to infer someone￿ s type from his actions.
The insurance industry is characterised by free-entry and absence of sunk or set-up
costs. This entails insurers must make zero pro￿ts in equilibrium. Denote by Qt ￿
[0;1) ￿ [0;1) the set of insurance contracts o⁄ered by insurance companies in period t.
De￿nition 1 (Equilibrium in the Insurance Market) An equilibrium in the insur-
ance market in period t consists of a set of contracts Qt; such that, given the entrepreneurs
optimal behaviour: 1) no insurance company makes any losses; and 2) given the set Qt,
there exists no insurance contract z, such that z = 2Qt and z 2 [0;1) ￿ [0;1), which, if
o⁄ered, would make non-negative expected pro￿ts.
Figure 3: Innovators and Innovations Timing
period t￿1
z }| { t￿
period t
z }| {
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ j￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ j￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ j￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ j￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
economy "inherits" innovators "play": innovators￿pro￿ts portfolio
At￿1 from t-1 At is determined are distributed decisions
Innovators: Finally, there exists a continuum of innovators indexed by i 2 [0;1].
Innovators also live just for one period. A new continuum [0;1] of innovators are spon-
taneously bred at the very beginning of each period. Innovators borrow capital from
international credit markets in order to invest in R&D and produce innovations. Innova-
tors "play" before insurers and entrepreneurs do (they "play" at some moment between
t￿ and portfolio decisions in Figure 2; see Figure 3 below). The rationale for this
timing is straightforward: it is innovators￿behaviour what ultimately determines the set
At; and only when At is actually determined can the entrepreneurs￿optimisation problem
in period t be fully speci￿ed.
Innovators are risk-neutral agents and, accordingly, seek to maximise expected pro￿ts.
We rationalise this by supposing that innovators are agents whose assets ultimately belong
to individuals. As a result of this, innovators will act as single-lived agents that maximise
expected pro￿ts, and afterwards distribute their pro￿ts among individuals7 (according to
their ownership shares).8
7The risk-neutrality result holds even if innovators face idiosyncratic shocks, since in that case (risk-
averse) individuals would hold fully diversi￿ed portfolios of shares on innovators assets. However, it does
necessarily require that there exist no aggregate shocks a⁄ecting innovators￿outcomes. In that sense, the
following model implicitly assumes no aggregate shocks of any sort a⁄ect our economy.
8Because the use of CARA preferences wipes out any sort of "wealth-e⁄ects", none of our model￿ s main
results will depend on how ownership on innovators assets is actually distributed among the population.
103 Entrepreneurs Optimisation Problem
In this section we present the optimisation problem faced by the (potential) entrepre-
neurs. As a benchmark, we start by looking at the hypothetical case in which types are
publicly observable. Subsequently, we proceed to study the problem under asymmetric
information, where adverse selection problems may distort the individuals optimal port-
folio allocation. Hereafter, full-information will designate those cases in which types and
portfolio allocations are publicly observable.
Recall that entrepreneurs choose their portfolio allocations after innovators have "played"
in our model. This means that an entrepreneur born in period t receives the set At as
exogenously given. Furthermore, this also implies his budget constraint will include the









t is the bequest received by the Type-j 2 [0;1] born in period t, and ￿
j
t repre-
sents the income derived from innovators pro￿ts received by this individual. Accordingly,
the variable w
j
t will represent the total amount of resources (i.e. initial-wealth) that the
Type-j born in period t will need to allocate in his portfolio allocation problem.
Notation - For the rest of this paper superscripts will always indicate the entrepreneur￿ s
type, St will represent the amount of initial wealth allocated to the safe-asset yielding ￿xed
net return r = 0, Ki;t will stand for the amount of capital invested in Project-i, and qt
will designate the quantity of Arrow-Debreu commodity insuring against entrepreneurial
failure that is purchased.
De￿nition 2 (Entrepreneurs Problem) Given (i) the set of active sectors At, (ii) the
set of o⁄ered insurance contracts Qt, (iii) the set of prices fPigi2At, and (iv) the level of















that maximises his expected utility function,
subject to his budget constraint.
3.1 Full-Information
3.1.1 Optimal allocation by a type whose "appropriate" sector is active:
Assume sector i 2 At, and study the optimisation problem of the Type-i entrepreneur.
Denote by pj the price of the Arrow-Debreu commodity which protects from entrepre-
neurial failure charged upon individuals of Type-j 2 [0;1]. Then, under full-information,
a Type-i will be confronted to pi = ￿ in case he specialises in Project-i, and to pi = 1
if he instead specialises in some Project-h 6= i, such that h 2 At.9 Given those prices,
it must be straightforward that a Type-i will always specialise in Project-i. Thus, his
9This stems from free-entry, plus the absence of any kind of ￿xed/set-up costs in the insurance industry.












































Recall F(K) = ￿K￿. To ease the algebra, assume henceforth that ￿ = [￿(1 ￿ ￿)]
￿1. In
addition to that, in order to avoid muddling the notation of subsequent equations, denote
￿i ￿ (￿Pi)￿1=(1￿￿) (hereafter we drop the time-subscripts when creating no confusion).
Note that ￿i is actually a decreasing function of Pi; however, from the entrepreneurs￿pre-
spective Pi is exogenously determined, hence we can safely take ￿i as an given parameter
throughout Section 3.10 From Problem (I) we may get the FOC: F 0(Ki
i) = ￿Pi(1 ￿ ￿)￿1;
which leads to the following optimal porfolio allocation:
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From Eq.(1)-(3) it can be noticed that individuals are able to completely smooth out
consumption across states of nature (end-of-period-wealth is given by yi = wi+(1￿￿)=￿,
regardless the state of nature).11
3.1.2 Optimal allocation by a type whose "appropriate" sector is inactive:
Let￿ s study now the situation faced by an individual of type h 2 [0;1], assuming that
sector h = 2 A. In principle, a Type-h would be able to invest in any Project-i, such that
i 2 A. At the same time, he could also buy insurance protecting from entrepreneurial
failure. However, given full-information, a Type-h should pay ph = 1 for each unit of
Arrow-Debreu commodity he buys. Since ￿i;h = 1 and ￿ < 1, then this Type-h will never
invest any amount of capital in Project-i. Clearly, by investing in the safe-asset, he is able
to obtain higher gross return (1+r = 1), bearing no risks. As a result, straightforwardly,
the Type-h optimisation problem -analogous to Problem (I)- delivers: Sh = wh, qh = 0,
and Kh
i = 0 for all i 2 A. Lastly, notice this Type-h obtains as (certain) maximum utility
level: ￿e￿w.12
10In Section 4, once we introduce the innovators decision problem, the equilibrium value of Pi will be
determined within the model (and the exact value of ￿i will be accordingly pinned down as well)






12Rigorously speaking, given that ph = ￿i;h = 1, there exist an in￿nite number of equilibria for this
particular Type-h entrepreneur. More precisely, any allocation in which: Sh = wh ￿ qh, Kh
i = 0 and
123.2 Asymmetric Information
We proceed now to study the entrepreneurs￿optimisation problem when types are private
information; this situation will naturally give rise to adverse selection problems in the
insurance market. In particular, any individual would be able to hide his type, and try
to take advantage of possible mismatches between the insurance market price and his
particular actuarially fair price.
Suppose sector h = 2 A, sector i 2 A, and sector j 2 A. Adverse selection problems
may emerge in two distinct modes. First, a Type-h = 2 A may wish to replicate the Type-
i 2 A behaviour in the market of the Arrow-Debreu commodity. Second, a Type-i 2 A
may wish to deviate from Project-i, and specialise in Project-j; trying to take advantage
of the fact that ￿j;i = 1. Notice that, in the ￿rst case, the the outside option available
to a Type-h = 2 A is just Sh = wh; whereas, in the second case, a Type-i 2 A has access
to a better outside option, since he could also succeed in Project-i. As result of this, the
adverse selection problem generated by a Type-h = 2 A will bring about worse consequences
than the adverse selection problem created by a Type-i 2 A. This is the key insight that
will be exploited in this paper; i.e. the fact that increasing the number of active sectors
reduces the severity of the adverse selection problem, by improving the outside option
available to some individuals.
For the rest of the paper we restrict the analysis to symmetric equilibria; where by
symmetric it is meant what follows: if sector i 2 A and sector j 2 A, then both the type-i
entrepreneur and the type-j entrepreneur must purchase the same amount of insurance
in equilibrium. This requires setting Pi = P, 8i 2 A (i.e. all sorts of physical capital,
used for di⁄erent entrepreneurial projects, are sold at the same price P).13 In any case,
as it will become clear later on in Section 4, any equilibrium in this model will necessarily
be symmetric.
In principle, given asymmetric information and the set of active sectors A ￿ [0;1],
one may expect two di⁄erent kinds of equilibria to arise in the insurance market: 1) a
pooling equilibrium, in which all types who buy the same amount of Arrow-Debreu com-
modity and pay a unique price; 2) a separating equilibrium, in which di⁄erent types buy
di⁄erent amounts of contingent commodity, and pay the actuarially fair price according to
their particular type (this would represent a Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) equilibrium).
In the remainder of this section we show that any equilibrium in the insurance market
must necessarily entail some sort of pooling-contracts. Subsequently, we fully characterise
the equilibrium pooling-contracts and the optimal portfolio allocations under asymmetric
information.
qh > 0, is also an optimum in this problem. We will disregard all these trivial results. Note that,
because ph = ￿i;h = 1, an Arrow-Debreu commodity sold to a Type-h = 2 A is (under full information)
indistinguishable from the safe-asset, since they both ultimately display exactly the same pay-o⁄function.
13Note that if Pi = P for all i 2 A, then ￿i = ￿ ￿ (￿P)￿1=(1￿￿) for all i 2 A.
133.2.1 Separating Insurance Contracts
Recall that Kh
i and Sh are both unobservable to insurance companies (at least at the
moment when signing up the insurance contract). Given that ￿i;h = 1 for all h 6= i and
￿ < 1, a Type-h will always optimally choose Kh
i = 0 (he would never invest any capital in
an entrepreneurial project for which he lacks the required skills, as he could never succeed
in that project). As a consequence of this, given the budget constraint, it must be the case
that Sh = wh ￿ phqh. Proposition 1 states that no separating equilibria, where insurers
screen agents according to their type, may possibly exist.
Proposition 1 Assume the set of inactive sectors is non-empty (i.e. Ac 6= ?). Take any
sector i 2 A and any sector h = 2 A. Then, there can never exist an equilibrium in the
insurance markets in which: qi 6= qh and qi > 0.
Proof. Given free-entry in the insurance industry, in an equilibrium with qi 6= qh, where
i 2 A and h = 2 A, failure probabilities are truthfully revealed; then, pi = ￿ and ph = 1 (so
that insurance companies make zero pro￿ts). Take some Type-h = 2 A; he would optimally
choose qh at unit-price ph = 1, instead of qi > 0 at unit-price pi = ￿, only if the contract
(ph = 1;qh) is incentive-compatible.
Denote by e Sh the amount invested in the safe-asset by the Type-h when "mimicking" the
Type-i behaviour in the insurance market. Since ￿i;h = 1, the incentive compatibility









Given ￿i;h = 1 and ￿ < 1, it is always the case that in an optimum Kh
i = 0. Thus,
by the budget constraint, we get: e Sh = wh ￿ PiKh
i ￿ piqi = wh ￿ ￿qi. Then, plugging
e Sh = wh ￿ ￿qi into Eq.(4) and cancelling out repeated expressions, we can re-write it as:
w
h ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)q
i + w
h (5)
Finally, from Eq.(5) it can be straightforwardly observed that incentive-compatibility would
necessarily require qi = 0.
3.2.2 Pooling Insurance Contracts
In a pooling equilibrium a certain amount of Arrow-Debreu commodity (say q) is sold at
a unique unit-price (say p) to any Type-l 2 [0;1] who wishes to buy it. Thus, a pooling
insurance contract displays, in general, the following structure: (p;q) 2 [0;1) ￿ (0;1),
with pay-o⁄ contingent on entrepreneurial success.
Keep assuming sector i 2 A and sector h = 2 A. Notice that a Type-h will always wish
to buy a pooling contract (p;q) 2 (￿;1) ￿ (0;1), as this contract renders him strictly
14Eq.(4) states that the utility obtained by a Type-h when he replicates the Type-i behaviour in the
insurance market should not exceed the utility this Type-h gets from his outside option (yh = wh).
14positive pay-o⁄ because his failure probability equals 1 in all active sectors (additionally,
he is indi⁄erent between buying, or not, any insurance contract sold at p = 1). Therefore,
given free-entry, any pooling equilibrium in the insurance market must verify the following
two properties. First, the equilibrium price must range p 2 (￿;1]; this is because the Type-
h always buys the pooling contract. Second, the equilibrium insurance contract must
maximise the expected utility of any Type-i, such that sector i 2 A; otherwise insurance
companies could o⁄er a di⁄erent contract such that it makes non-negative pro￿ts and, at
the same time, makes a Type-i better-o⁄. Bearing all this in mind, in order to derive the
equilibrium pooling contract, as a ￿rst step, we can start by solving the following problem






























i > 0 and p 2 (￿;1]
The solution of Problem (II) is characterised in Lemma 1.


















and note that p 2 (￿;1). Then:


































2) For all p ￿ p, Problem (II) delivers:
q
i = 0 (9)
K
i








i = w ￿ P K (11)
Lemma 1 states that when the price of the Arrow-Debreu commodity rises above p,
then the optimal demand of this commodity falls down to zero. As a consequence, only
15when a pooling equilibrium can be supported at a price p 2 (￿;p), will this equilibrium
entail positive insurance provision. From Lemma 1 we can also observe that, for all p > ￿;
the amount invested in Project-i by the Type-i will be strictly below ￿. Recalling from
Eq.(1) that Ki
i = ￿ represents its full-information solution; this means the market failure
in the insurance market also distorts entrepreurs￿investment decisions, discouraging risk-
taking.
The Incentive Compatibility Constraint: Solving Problem (II) does not su¢ ce to
fully characterise the pooling equilibrium in the market of the Arrow-Debreu commodity.
Because ￿i;h = 1, when sector h = 2 A, a Type-h will always ￿nd pro￿table to buy an
insurance contract (pi;qi) 2 (￿;1) ￿ (0;1). However, we haven￿ t yet studied whether a
Type-i, given that sector i 2 A, indeed desires to behave according to what Lemma 1
stipulates. In fact, since a Type-i can also hide his type, he might well wish to deviate from
choosing sector i, and pretend to be, for instance, a Type-j by specialising in sector j 2 A.
As a consequence of this, we also need to check the incentive compatibility constraint (IC)
for a type whose "appropriate" sector is active, so that to o⁄er only incentive-compatible
insurance contracts.
Consider the situation in which both sector i and j belong to A. The IC for an
entrepreneur of type-i appears below in Eq.(12), where qj(p) represents the amount of
Arrow-Debreu commodity purchased by Types-j at price p (notice we have already incor-
porated into Eq.(12) the fact that, as a general property of CARA preferences, the value





































The LHS of Eq.(12) amounts the expected utility achieved by a Type-i when his portfolio
allocation is given by [Si(wi;p);qi(p);Ki
i(p)]. The RHS equals the utility obtained by
this Type-i when he replicates the behaviour Type-j in the insurance market, and, at the
same time, invests the remainder of wi in the safe-asset (which then equals wi ￿ pqj(p)).
Thus, Eq.(12) simply states that a Type-i should ￿nd no incentive to deviate from the
portfolio allocation [Si(wi;p);qi(p);Ki
i(p)], by pretending to be an individual of Type-j.
In a symmetric equilibrium, by de￿nition: qi(p) = qj(p) = q(p), must hold 8i;j 2 A.
Replacing qi(p) = qj(p) = q(p) into Eq.(12), we can easily provide another interpretation
to the incentive-compatibility constraint. Assume that a Type-i will need to exert some
e⁄ort in order to succeed in Project-i with probability 1￿￿; but suppose e⁄ort is cost-less
(to avoid mixing adverse selection with moral hazard problems). In that case, Eq.(12)
could also be understood as an IC on the e⁄ort level exerted by this Type-i when running
his own Project-i. In that sense that, on the one hand, if he plans to shirk and let Project-i
15N.B: Si(wi;p), qi(p) and Ki
i(p), are not necessarily given by Problem (II) solution, represented
by Eq.(8) or (11), Eq.(6) or (9), and Eq.(7) or (10); respectively. As just mentioned in the previous
paragraph, those solutions are not necessarily incentive-compatible.
16fail with probability equal to 1, his optimal allocation would be given by: Ki
i = 0, qi = q
and Si = w ￿ pq; leading to the utility level shown in RHS of Eq.(12). On the other
hand, in the case the Type-i chooses to put the needed e⁄ort in Project-i, the LHS of
Eq.(12) amounts the expected utility he would then obtain. As long as Eq.(12) holds,
this Type-i will indeed exert the required e⁄ort level in order to succeed in Project-i with
probability 1 ￿ ￿.
Denote by p￿ the equilibrium price in the insurance market. Then, it follows:
Lemma 2 Take any i and j 2 A. Then, there exists a unique real value b p 2 (￿;p),
such that: i) 8p￿ > b p, the IC stipulated in Eq.(12) does not bind in equilibrium; and ii)
8p￿ ￿ b p, the IC stated in Eq.(12) binds in equilibrium.
The result enunciated in Lemma 2 is key in order to ￿nd our model￿ s equilibrium
solution. Succinctly, if the equilibrium price p￿ exceeds the value b p, where b p 2 (￿;p);
then, the optimal solutions stated in Lemma 1 (i.e. Eq.(7)-(8), or Eq.(10)-(11)) will indeed
correspond to the pooling-equilibrium of our model. Intuitively, whenever p￿ > b p, Problem
(II) solution is also incentive-compatible for any Type-i, such that i 2 A; therefore, it
can be safely implemented under asymmetric information. In addition to that, since any
individual of type-i, such that i 2 A, is maximising his expected utility, there exists no
other feasible contract which yields non-negative pay-o⁄ and would still be purchased by
those individuals.
What happens when p￿ ￿ b p ? According to Lemma 2, the IC will be binding in
equilibrium. Denote by b q(p￿) the incentive-compatible level of q at price level p = p￿
derived from Eq.(12). When the IC binds, the pooling equilibrium contract can be found
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Since the IC binds, it must be the case that qi = b q(p￿). On the other hand, inada
conditions imply that, in an optimum, Ki
i > 0 must always hold. Hence, the FOC
@L=@Si = @L=@Ki













Eq.(13) implicitly delivers a function Ki
i = b K(b q(p￿)), strictly increasing in b q(p￿), which
describes the optimal choice of Ki
i when qi = b q(p￿). In addition to this, using the budget
constraint, Si = b S(b q(p￿)) = w ￿ P b K(b q(p￿)) ￿ p￿b q(p￿). We lastly need to pin down the
exact functional form of b q(p￿). To do this, we can replace qi = b q(p￿), Ki
i = b K(b q(p￿)) and
Si = b S(b q(p￿)) into Eq.(12), to obtain
e
￿P b K(b q(p￿))
h
￿e
￿b q(p￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)e













￿P b K(b q(p￿))
"
F 0( b K(b q(p￿)))
F 0( b K(b q(p￿))) ￿ ￿P
#
= 1 (14)
Lemma 3 The value of b q that solves Eq.(14) does not depend on p￿; i.e., b q(p￿) = b q.
We can now use Lemma 2 to exactly pin down the value of b q. More precisely, notice
that, by the de￿nition of b p in Lemma 2, b q must be given by the value taken by qi in Eq.(6)



















Where, it must be clear that, since b p < p, then b q > 0. Furthermore, Eq.(15), incidentally,
leads to:
b K = ￿
￿





Where it be observed that, since ￿ < b p < p; then, the value of b K must be strictly smaller
than ￿ (which represents the full-information solution according to Eq.(1)) and, at the
same time, b K will be strictly bigger than the value of Ki
i delivered by the RHS of Eq.(10).
The pooling equilibrium in the insurance market, given the equilibrium price p￿, can
now be fully characterised.
Proposition 2 Assume A ￿ [0;1] and A 6= ?; and take some sector i 2 A. Then:
i) A pooling equilibrium insurance contract with q￿ > 0 exists if, and only if, p￿ < p.
ii) Whenever p￿ 2 [p;1), in equilibrium: q￿ = 0: In addition to that,
K
i







and the IC constraint stipulated in Eq.(12) does not bind in equilibrium.




















and the IC constraint stipulated in Eq.(12) does not bind. In addition to that, in such an










18iv) Whenever p￿ 2 (￿; b p], the equilibrium insurance contract encompasses:
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Figure 4: Equilibrium Levels of Ki
i and qi
i.
Proposition 2 is illustrated in Figure 4.16 Whenever A ￿ [0;1] and A 6= ?, in equilib-
rium, p￿ must necessarily lie within the interval (￿;1). In Figure 4: (i) when p￿ 2 (p;1)
the non-negativity constraint on qi binds, while the IC in Eq.(12) is not binding; as a
consequence, qi = q￿ = 0 and Ki
i = K; (ii) 8p￿ 2 [b p;p] neither the IC, nor the qi ￿ 0
binds; accordingly, in that range Ki
i is given by Eq.(7) and qi is described by Eq.(6),
with p = p￿; (iii) 8p￿ 2 (￿; b p) the IC is binding (while qi ￿ 0 does not bind); thus, over
that interval Ki
i = b K and qi = b q. Finally, notice that, for all p￿ 2 (￿;1), investment in
Project-i remains below ￿ and the demand of the Arrow-Debreu commodity stays below
￿￿
￿; which represent their full-information solutions, respectively - see Eq.(1) and Eq.(2),
after plugging in Pi = P.
16The functions Ki
i(p) and qi(p) in Figure 2 are plotted for a given value of P (which, in turn, implies
a given value of ￿).
193.2.3 The Equilibrium Price in Pooling Contracts
Proposition 2 characterises the entrepreneurs￿ optimal portfolio allocation, given the
pooling-equilibrium insurance price p￿. Hence, in order to ￿nd the exact portfolio al-
location that holds in period t, it only remains to pin down the value taken by p￿ in that
period.
Insurance companies make zero pro￿ts in equilibrium. This implies the value of p￿
should just re￿ ect the average failure probability of the pool of individuals who buy the
insurance contract. Let￿ s denote the average failure probability in period t by ft. Then,
p￿
t = ft. How is the value of ft determined?
Note ￿rstly that, since insurance contracts o⁄ered in equilibrium comply with the IC
written down in Eq.(12); then, any individual of type-i 2 [0;1], such that i 2 At, will
always specialise and invest in Project-i. This implies that a fraction nt of the population
in the economy displays failure probability equal to ￿.
Secondly, take any individual of type-h 2 [0;1], such that sector h = 2 At. This set
of individuals represents a fraction 1 ￿ nt of the whole population. Additionally, since
￿i;h = 1 for all i 6= h, they all exhibit failure probability equal to 1, no matter which sector
i 2 At they choose to specialise in.
Proposition 3 p￿
t = p￿
t(nt) = 1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)nt.
Proof. The proof is straightforward from the fact that ft = ￿￿nt +1￿(1￿nt), and the
fact that p￿
t = ft.
Proposition 3 re￿ ects one of the key insights of this paper. Increasing the number of
active sectors induces more e¢ cient operation of risk-sharing institutions; this is because a
higher value of nt permits better allocation of talents, ameliorating the adverse selection
problem a⁄ecting this economy. In order to close the model, we must then proceed
to ￿nally make explicit how the value of nt is determined in equilibrium; this requires
incorporating innovators￿optimisation problem into the model.
4 Innovators, Innovations and Sectors Expansion
We model the appearance of new sectors as the result of innovations. These innovations
are the consequence of deliberate R&D policies undertaken by private agents to which we
refer to as innovators. We focus only on horizontal innovations, since these are the kind
of innovations that will lead to improvements in the allocation of individuals￿talent; the
key mechanism at work in this paper.
Recall there is a continuum of innovators indexed by i along the interval [0;1]. Except
for their particular index i 2 [0;1], all innovators are ex-ante identical; displaying risk-
neutrality, living for one period only, and starting o⁄ their lives with zero initial-wealth.
These conditions are identically reproduced in every single period t. We assume an inno-
vator i 2 [0;1] can only possibly innovate for sector i 2 [0;1]. Since we disregard vertical
innovations, (by construction) the subset of innovators who innovate for sectors which
20were already active at the end of period t ￿ 1 will not play any relevant role in period t
(in other words, if sector i 2 At￿1, then innovator i remains "inactive" in period t).
An innovation in period t for sector h = 2 At￿1 materialises as the chance to invest in
Project-h (in other words, it creates the technology needed to undertake Project-h). This,
in turn, implies that sector h 2 At. We suppose innovations arise as embodied technical
change. This means the innovation that brings Project-h into life is "contained" within
each unit of physical capital Kh (and, accordingly, putting this innovation into action
requires buying Kh). It is assumed that each unit of capital good Kh is produced by
its corresponding innovator h 2 [0;1] at a constant unit-cost equal to 1. As a result, the
innovation activity entails two distinct types of costs: ￿rst, innovators must invest in R&D
in order to be able to design an innovation; second, they must also incur in a unit-cost
equal to 1 in order to physically produce each unit of capital good Kh "containing" the
innovation. At last, an innovator h 2 [0;1], such that h 2 At, must choose the optimal
price Ph at which to sell each unit of Kh.17
Innovators seek to maximise expected pro￿ts. Their optimisation problem consists
in choosing two variables: 1) how much to ex-ante invest in R&D (henceforth denoted
by ￿); 2) the price Ph at which to sell their (embodied) innovations (of course, as long
as h 2 At).18 A higher value of ￿ will be naturally associated with a higher probability
of producing an innovation. Given an amount ￿ invested in R&D, the probability of
designing an innovation is given by the non-decreasing function ￿(￿); for simplicity and
without any loss of generality, suppose:
￿(￿) = 0 if ￿ 2 [0;1); and ￿(￿) = ￿ 2 (0;1) if ￿ ￿ 1
4.1 Innovators Problem under Full Information
By assumption, vertical innovations are precluded. Therefore, if sector i 2 At￿1, then
innovator i 2 [0;1] will trivially choose ￿￿
i;t = 0. Because of that, only an innovator
h 2 [0;1], such that sector h = 2 At￿1, will turn out "active" during period t in our model.
Assume sector h = 2 At￿1, and take some entrepreneur of type-h born in period t. Under
full information, this Type-h would invest Kh
h;t = ￿h;t = (￿Ph;t)￿1=(1￿￿), were Project-h to
become available in period t (i.e. in case sector h 2 At). On the other hand, a Type-j 6= h
would always choose K
j
h;t = 0. As a result, the individual of type-h 2 [0;1] represents
the whole prospective market for innovator h 2 [0;1], and the optimisation problem this
innovator solves reads as follows:
MAX
￿h;t￿0;Ph;t￿0
: E [￿h(￿h;t;Ph;t)] = ￿(￿h;t) (Ph;t￿1)K(Ph;t) ￿ ￿h;t (III)
s:t: : K(Ph;t) =(￿Ph;t)
￿1=(1￿￿)
17Notice that, if sector i 2 At￿1, although (by assumption) innovator i will not need to invest in R&D
for this sector in period t, he will still need to produce the capital-goods Ki at unit-cost equal to 1, and
also select the price Pi at which to sell each unit of Ki.
18It is implicitly assumed that innovators cannot charge contingent-prices on their innovations. If that
were possible, risk-neutral innovators could o⁄er some type of insurance by charging a lower price when
the entrepreneurial project fails.
21Leaving aside "knife-edge" situations, due to its linearity, Problem (III) will yield
corner solutions; i.e. either ￿￿
h;t = 0 or ￿￿
h;t = 1.
Lemma 4 Take any innovator h = 2 At￿1 and assume ￿￿
h;t = 1. If this innovator h succeeds
in designing an innovation for sector h in period t (i.e. if h 2 At), then he will optimally
charge a price P￿
h;t = ￿￿1.
Notice from Lemma 4 that all successful innovators charge an identical price on each
unit of Kh (which is also constant across t); namely, P￿
h;t = P￿ = ￿￿1. Moreover, Lemma
4 implies that, if ￿￿









We are interested in those cases where economies would display positive innovation
under full information. Accordingly, suppose parameters are such that ￿￿
FI > 0, so that
Problem (III) indeed delivers ￿￿
h;t = 1 for all h = 2 At￿1. As ￿nal remark, notice that, so far,
we haven￿ t said anything at all about the value of nt (i.e. the fraction active sectors). In
other words, under full-information, the degree of market incompleteness becomes utterly
irrelevant, since (by de￿nition) no adverse selection problems may possibly arise.
4.2 Innovators Behaviour under Asymmetric Information
When there is asymmetric information about skills and adverse selection problems accord-
ingly arise, the fraction of active sectors (nt) becomes relevant. Intuitively, the degree
of market incompleteness, measured by (1 ￿ nt), will a⁄ect the severity of the adverse
selection problem in the insurance market. This, in turn, in￿ uences the optimal entrepre-
neurial investment level, a⁄ecting innovators￿expected pro￿ts.
Denote by
_
￿t the value of ￿t chosen by all innovators k 6= h 2 [0;1], such that sector
k = 2 At￿1.19 The maximisation problem for innovator h in period t, reads now:
MAX
￿h;t￿0;Ph;t￿0
: E [￿h (￿h;t;Ph;t;p
￿
t)] = ￿(￿h;t) (Ph;t ￿ 1) K(p
￿
t;Ph;t) ￿ ￿h;t (IV)
19More precisely,
_
￿t represents the rational expectation formed by innovator h about the value of ￿t




t = 1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)nt (17)
nt = nt￿1 + ￿(
_
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Eq.(17) re￿ ects Proposition 3. Eq.(18) stems from the assumption that, once a sector
becomes active it does never revert to inactive in the future; added to the fact that a
fraction ￿(
_
￿) of all sectors which were inactive during period t￿1 become active in period
t as a result of innovations perpetrated by innovators k 6= h (such that k = 2 At￿1). Eq.(19)
is taken from Proposition 2. Eq.(20) implicitly pins down the value taken by p; notice
that p = p(Ph;t), and p0(Ph;t) < 0. Finally, Eq.(21) implicitly yields the value taken by b p;
again, note that b p = b p(Ph;t), and b p0(Ph;t) < 0.
Remark 1 Since all innovators h 2 [0;1], such that sector h = 2 At￿1, (i.e. all "active"





t ) 8h. Additionally, note that all innovators i 2 [0;1], such that sector
i 2 At￿1, (i.e. all "inactive" innovators in t), solve:
MAX
Pi;t
: e ￿i (Pi;t;p
￿
t) = (Pi;t ￿ 1)K(p
￿
t;Pi;t);
subject to: Eq.(17)-(21). It must be straightforward to observe that this last optimisation




8i;h. This ￿nally entails that the equilibrium in the insurance market must necessarily be
symmetric, as originally supposed in Section 3.2.
From Problem (IV), we can derive the following condition for the optimal choice of ￿t:
￿
￿




￿t;nt￿1)] ￿ 0; otherwise: ￿
￿
t = 0:
Problem (IV) cannot be, however, analytically solved; mainly for two di⁄erent reasons.
First, the function K(p￿
t;Ph;t) displays "kinks" at p and b p, and it is accordingly non-
di⁄erentiable at those points (Figure 2). Second, and more importantly, it is not possible
23to provide a closed-form solution for the relations p(Ph;t) and b p(Ph;t); though we can
prove these relations are indeed continuous and strictly decreasing functions. Despite
the lack of analytical solution, some important general results for Problem (IV) can be
proved without much trouble. Denote by ￿￿
FI the maximal of the function E [￿(￿)] under
full information, and by ￿￿
AI the maximal of the function E [￿(￿)] under asymmetric
information; Proposition 4 provides the main results derived from Section 4.
Proposition 4 (i) ￿￿
FI > ￿￿
AI, (ii) ￿￿





Firstly, the intuition for ￿￿
FI > ￿￿
AI lies on the fact that entrepreneurial investment
under full information is always higher than under asymmetric information, as can be ob-
served from comparing Eq.(1) to results in Proposition 2. Secondly, ￿￿
AI is non-decreasing
in nt￿1, because nt￿1 and nt exhibit positive serial correlation, and a higher nt is associ-




￿t, as a larger value of
_
￿t helps to reduce adverse selection problems during period t by
expanding the number of active sectors in t due to innovations by other innovators; this
fact implies there exist positive externalities across innovators.
4.3 A Numerical Solution for Problem (IV)
In this sub-section we present a numerical solution for the innovators￿optimisation prob-
lem under asymmetric information. The intention of this sub-section is just to further
illustrate the ideas developed so far in this paper and, additionally, to provide a clear
numerical (and graphical) exposition of the results stated in Proposition 4. We set the
parameters￿values as follows: ￿ = 0:1, ￿ = 0:3, ￿ = 0:3, and ￿ = 0:6. The maximisation
problem was solved with MATLAB. Notice those parameters imply ￿￿
FI = 0:4.20
Figure 5 depicts the value of ￿￿
AI(￿t = 1), de￿ned as the maximum level of expected
pro￿ts under asymmetric information if we ￿xed ￿t = 1, for di⁄erent values of nt￿1 and
_
￿t. The thicker line shows ￿￿
AI(￿t = 1;nt￿1) when
_
￿t = 1, while the thinner line portrays
￿￿
AI(￿t = 1;nt￿1) when
_
￿t = 0. Both functions are (non-strictly) increasing in nt￿1, in







￿t = 0), for all nt￿1 2 [0;1], re￿ ecting point (iii) of Proposition 4.
Notice, as well, that ￿￿
AI(￿t = 1;nt￿1) always remains below ￿￿





￿t = 0; in agreement with point (i) of Proposition 4. Finally, observe that for values
of nt￿1 su¢ ciently low, both functions eventually display negative expected pro￿ts. This
implies that for those (su¢ ciently low) values of nt￿1, ￿t = 1 cannot be an optimal choice,
and innovators will instead set ￿￿
t = 0 (so that to obtain ￿￿
AI = 0).
20The MATLAB codes are available from the author upon request. In Appendix B the solution to
this problem is presented in further detail. Additionally, examples with di⁄erent parameters settings are





Figure 5: Innovators￿expected pro￿ts when ￿t = 1, as a function of nt￿1 and
_
￿t:
No Innovation Due to Coordination Failures: Notice that, for a given nt￿1, ex-
pected pro￿ts are (weakly) increasing in
_
￿t. As a result of this, in general, ￿￿
t will be a
non-decreasing function of
_
￿t; which re￿ ects the fact that innovators￿behaviour displays
strategic complementarity, a property that may bring forth coordination failures (Cooper
and John (1988)). In this model, coordination failures arise when everybody optimally
responds with ￿￿
t = 0, if everybody expects
_
￿t = 0; but, the optimal choice would had been
￿￿
t = 1, had everyone instead coordinated their expectations on
_
￿t = 1. Looking at Fig-
ure 5, we can observe that coordination failures may arise for values of nt￿1 2 [0:47;0:79].
Over that range, if
_
￿t = 0 holds, then ￿￿
t = 0; on the other hand, if
_
￿t = 1, then ￿￿
t = 1
will be veri￿ed.
No Innovation as Unique Optimal Solution (no coordination failures): Under
some circumstances, no investment in R&D might too be the optimal innovators￿action
even if expectations were fully optimistic. That is to say, ￿￿
t = 0 may sometimes be
optimal even under
_




￿t = 1) < 0. As a consequence of this, for all nt￿1 < 0:47, the unique
optimal solution to the innovators￿maximisation problem is given by ￿￿
t = 0 (no matter
what the value of
_
￿t is).
Positive Innovation as Unique Optimal Solution: This last case arises for all values
of nt￿1 > 0:79. In those cases, all innovators would optimally select ￿￿
t = 1, regardless
25whether
_
￿t = 0 or
_




￿t = 0) and ￿￿
AI(￿t = 1;nt￿1;
_
￿t = 1), are strictly positive.
5 Aggregate Dynamic Analysis
The analysis of this economy has remained until now within a static framework, in the
sense that initial conditions have been taken as exogenously set, and we have focused
on agents￿optimal behaviour given these initial conditions. In particular, the set At￿1
(and, hence, the variable nt￿1) has been so far taken as exogenously given. The use of
CARA preferences implies wealth distribution loses all relevance concerning risk-taking
choices; leaving the fraction of active sectors (i.e. nt) as the sole variable whose behaviour
we need to study, in order to keep track of this economy￿ s dynamics. That is to say, nt
remains as the only relevant state-variable in our model. We provide now the de￿nitions
of both static equilibrium and dynamic equilibrium. Subsequently, we describe the distinct
characteristics of three di⁄erent cases in terms of its dynamic paths, which correspond to
dissimilar initial conditions. These cases are referred to as: prosperity and development,
secular stagnation, and multiple equilibria (history vs. expectations).21
De￿nition 3 (Static Equilibrium) Given: (i) the size of the set At￿1 measured by the
variable nt￿1, and (ii) the set of bequests fbi
tgi2[0;1], describing the amount of bequest re-
ceived by each Type-i at the beginning of period t (bi
t). An equilibrium in period t is a
situation in which:
a) The insurance market is in equilibrium, according to De￿nition 1.
b) The entrepreneurs portfolio allocations are optimal for all i 2 [0;1], according to De￿-
nition 2.
c) The pair (￿￿
h;t;P￿







8k6=h2[0;1], and the fact that innovators￿expectations are formed
rationally.




t ) for all h 2 At￿1. We can, thus,
provide a our de￿nition of a dynamic equilibrium in a very concise way.
De￿nition 4 (Dynamic Equilibrium) A dynamic equilibrium is a sequence of static
equilibria, linked together across time by the "law of motion" of nt speci￿ed in Eq.(22)
nt = nt￿1 + ￿(￿
￿
t)(1 ￿ nt￿1): (22)
5.1 Secular Stagnation
Take an economy for which the value of n0 is such that n0 < 0:47. For this economy, the
equilibrium in period t = 1 is unique, and it is characterised by ￿￿
1 = 0. In addition to zero
21For expositional clarity we will describe those three cases by referring to the numerical example
presented in Section 4.3.
26investment in R&D and absence of innovation; this economy will exhibit very ine¢ cient
insurance services provision (underdeveloped risk-sharing institutions), and low levels of
entrepreneurial investment. Ine¢ cient insurance provision is the consequence of severe
adverse selection problems, which stem from the high degree of sectors incompleteness.
On the other hand, repressed entrepreneurship is the result of both lack of opportunities
(due to sectors incompleteness) and discouraged risk-taking behaviour due to ine¢ cient
insurance provision.
From Eq.(22), since ￿￿
1 = 0, then n1 = n0; and, accordingly, ￿￿
2 = 0 will hold as
unique equilibrium in t = 2. Furthermore, in the absence of any substantial exogenous
technological shock, this sort of equilibrium will perpetuate itself for all t = f3;4;:::;1g;
constituting a "poverty-trap" in this model, and characterised by complete stagnation.
5.2 Prosperity and Development
Let￿ s look now at an economy for which n0 is large enough; in particular, n0 > 0:79.
The equilibrium in period t = 1 is unique, and displays ￿￿
1 = 1. Intuitively, the initial
degree of market incompleteness is quite low, which implies adverse selection problems
do not substantially distort the operation of this economy. Given Eq.(22), since ￿￿
1 = 1,
thus n1 > n0. As a consequence of this, the equilibrium in period t = 2 will also exhibit
￿￿
2 = 1. Moreover, this prosperous sequence will be perpetuated ad in￿nitum. Proposition
5 formally states the prosperous dynamics of an economy that starts o⁄with a su¢ ciently
high level of n0.
Proposition 5 Denote by e n the value of nt, such that it (implicitly) solves the following
equation: ￿ (P￿(e n) ￿ 1)K￿(1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)e n;P￿(e n)) = 1; where K￿(￿) is given by Eq.(19).
Then, if n0 > e n, this economy will monotonically (and asymptotically) converge to an
equilibrium in which n1 = 1.
Proposition 5 argues that, when the initial degree of market incompleteness is su¢ -
ciently low (i.e. n0 is su¢ ciently large), this economy will eventually reach an equilibrium
characterised by complete markets (n1 = 1). During the transition period, the economy
experiences development and growth, which manifests as a continuous process of sectors
expansion (capital di⁄erentiation) and a more e¢ cient allocation of skills. Simultaneously,
the operation of risk-pooling institutions concomitantly improves, as a consequence of less
severe adverse selection problems due to lower degree of market incompleteness.
5.3 Multiple Equilibria (History vs. Expectations)
When the value of n0 2 [0:47;0:79], this economy will be subject to multiple equilibria.
Equilibrium multiplicity will be driven by innovators￿expectations. In particular, if inno-
vators￿expectations coordinate in
_
￿1 = 0, then ￿￿
1 = 0; whereas, if they instead coordinate
in
_
￿1 = 1, then ￿￿
1 = 1. More importantly, from a dynamic perspective, whether expec-
tations in t = 1 lead to
_
￿1 = 0 or
_
￿1 = 1, may carry dramatic future consequences. By
Eq.(22), ￿￿
1 = 0 entails that n1 = n0, so initial conditions (in terms of nt￿1) for t = 2 would
27identically replicate those faced in t = 1. On the other hand, ￿￿
1 = 1 means n1 > n0; as a
result, this might shoot up n1 above 0:79, and ignite a process of continuous prosperity and
development, as the one described in Section 5.2. For an economy with nt￿1 2 [0:47;0:79],
the bigger nt￿1 is, the higher the chances that nt > 0:79 will hold if ￿￿
t￿1 = 1, and that
the economy is accordingly put on safe track for long-run prosperity from t + 1 onwards.
When the economy is located within [0:47;0:79], then both history and expectations
matter, in the sense of Krugman (1991). Since, in each single period, a new generation of
innovators is born; there is no reason why to expect that
_
￿t should have any e⁄ect on any
_
￿t+￿, where ￿ 2 f1;2;:::;1g (that is to say, there is no reason why expectations should
exhibit any sort of serial correlation, concerning di⁄erent static equilibria). Therefore,
even if expectations in period t were, for any reason, coordinated in
_
￿t = 1 (leading to
￿￿
t = 1); we may well still commence period t + 1 again within the interval [0:47;0:79],
at the risk of experiencing coordination failures. This could lead to cyclical dynamics,
driven by expectations, with periods of growth and technical change, followed by periods
of stagnation.
6 A Quick Look at Some Data
A key prediction of our theory is that the degree of sectoral diversi￿cation positively af-
fects the operation of ￿nancial institutions. In particular, this paper argues that higher
degree of sectoral diversi￿cation permits an improved operation of risk-sharing institu-
tions, since it helps to ameliorate adverse selection problems. We present in this section
some empirical observations which are consistent with this prediction of the model.
Table 1 provides some evidence consistent with this fact. To measure sectoral con-
centration, we utilise the same Gini and Her￿ndahl indices for employment shares based
on the UNIDO data used by Imbs and Wacziarg (2003).22 The dependent variable in all
regressions is the logarithm of the stock market capitalisation to GDP, whose data is taken
from Beck et al (1999).23 Data on GDP per capita is taken from Heston, Summers and
Aten (2002).
The ￿rst two columns in Table 1 show that both measures of sectoral concentration
are negatively (and signi￿cantly) correlated with the level of stock market development.
Given that these estimates may be simply capturing the fact that GDP per-capita is
correlated with both the independent and dependent variables, we include GDP per-capita
in regressions (3) and (4); the regression coe¢ cients associated to the Gini and Her￿ndahl
are reduced in magnitude, but they still remain signi￿cant at 1% level. Furthermore, all
these results are also robust to the inclusion of country ￿xed-e⁄ects, as shown in the last
two columns of Table 1
22The author is indebted to Jeam Imbs for kindly providing him with this data.
23Similar regressions were also run for other ￿nancial development indicators taken from Beck et al
(1999); namely: stock market total value traded to GDP, liquid liabilities to GDP, and non-life insurance
premiums as a share of GDP. All regressions led to similar results as those shown in Table 1, and are
available from the author upon request.
28TABLE 1: Contemporaneous Regression
Independent OLS OLS OLS OLS fixed-effects fixed-effects
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2)
Gini -5.59 -2.87 -8.76
(0.835) (0.831) (1.592)
Herfindahl -11.03 -7.88 -8.54
(1.028) (1.057) (1.503)
GDP per-capita 0.113 0.093 0.396 0.355
(0.013) (0.012) (0.025) (0.023)
R squared 0.087 0.197 0.220 0.285 0.220 0.251
Dependent variable: logarithm of stock market capitalisation to GDP (1963-1992)
Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include intercept. Observations: 471
All estimates are significant at 1% level.
Reverse causation might be an issue leading to overestimation of the regressors as-
sociated to the concentration indices in Table 1. In particular, increasing stock markets
development might encourage agents to specialise in di⁄erent sectors (for which they
maybe possess comparative advantages), since sector-speci￿c and idiosyncratic shocks
can be then more e¢ ciently insured. Table 2 intends to address this matter by regressing
the average log stock market capitalisation to GDP over the period 1981-1992, on the level
of sectoral concentration in 1980 (measured again by the Gini and Her￿ndahl indices).
Both regressions indicate that higher degree of (past) sectoral diversi￿cation signi￿cantly
predicts more developed stock markets.
TABLE 2: Stock Market Development and Initial Sectoral Concentration
Independent Variable OLS (5) OLS (6)
Gini in 1980 -4.93*
(2.881)
Herfindahl in 1980 -8.04**
(3.279)
R squared 0.070 0.134
Observations 41 41
Dependent variable: avg. log of stock market cap. to GDP (1981-1992)
Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include intercept.
* significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level.
297 Concluding Discussion
Credit motives vs. insurance motives: Throughout this paper we have completely
abstracted from credit-constraints issues, by assuming that all agents have perfect access
to credit markets at the given international interest rate. In principle, our adverse selec-
tion argument stemming from unobservability of individuals￿skills could be also applied
to credit markets, in a similar way as done by Ghatak, Morelli and Sj￿str￿m (2002).
The credit-channel would work analogously as the insurance-channel presented here; the
availability of many sectors permits better allocation of individual talent, ameliorating
adverse selection problems which, in turn, enables better operation of credit markets.
Yet, we have decided to close this additional channel, making use only of the ine¢ ciency
in the insurance market. The reason for this choice is motivated by our intention to isolate
the e⁄ect of the number of active sectors; this requires wiping out any sort of "wealth-
e⁄ect" which may possibly arise in our model. When working with imperfect credit
markets, limited-liability issues immediately generate positive wealth-e⁄ects (in the sense
that richer agents enjoy better access to credit markets, because they are further away
from their limited-liability constraint), which inevitably incapacitates the model to isolate
the "sectors-e⁄ect".
Insurance companies vs. stock markets: This paper has synthesized any sort of
risk-sharing institution by assuming that insurance services are provided by private agents
called insurance companies. The insurance companies artifact is just posed for modelling
simplicity. In reality, agents share idiosyncratic risks by di⁄erent means, and one of the
most important institutions to deal with pooling risks are stock markets. Our model could
be reformulated in a way such that entrepreneurs will insure themselves by utilising stock
markets. More precisely, we could suppose that individuals can issue and sell a continuum
of securities on their own projects. These securities would then represent shares on the
project￿ s return, whose pay-o⁄ would be contingent on the state of nature. Since project
risks are purely idiosyncratic, individuals can diversify away all risks by holding fully
diversi￿ed portfolios. Furthermore, in equilibrium, competition on securities will drive its
price down to its expected return. Expected returns are negatively a⁄ected by adverse
selection, because more severe adverse selection problems means higher average failure
probability; this implies the securities equilibrium price will be smaller, the higher the
level of market incompleteness. This last result is exactly analogous to Proposition 3
expressing that the pooling-equilibrium insurance price increases when adverse selection
problems worsen.
Poverty alleviation programmes: This paper predicts that some economies might get
stuck in a poverty-trap; this is the result of a "deep-rooted" organisational failure, a⁄ecting
several di⁄erent markets. Underdevelopment is characterised by few sectors in which
individuals can specialise, underdeveloped ￿nancial institutions, and scant innovation
activities. The market failure contaminating the operation of the economy in our paper
(i.e. the adverse selection problem) derives from the incapacity of some individuals to
￿nd the activity or sector for which they display comparative skills. In most of theories of
30poverty-traps, economies can be easily rescued from long-run poverty simply by receiving
a su¢ ciently large wealth-transfer. Instead, our theory claims that foreign-aid should
presumably also include important transfers of technology, as standard wealth-transfers
alone might not be enough to solve the adverse selection problem this economy su⁄ers
from (at least in a reasonably short time frame).
Testing the theory: In Section 1.1, Tables 1 and 2 have intended to provide some
evidence consistent with the theory presented in this paper. Nevertheless, these obser-
vations by no means prove our theory key predictions. In order to do so, we would
ideally need to count with some important exogenous shock that suddenly shrinks (or in-
creases) the degree of market incompleteness that individuals face. The European Union
last enlargement in May 2004, could presumably be exploited as such a shock. The last
EU enlargement has incorporated 10 new countries whose income and development level
was signi￿cantly lower than for the average previous EU-15 countries. From the new 10
economies perspective, the incorporation to the EU will expectably mean a drastic ex-
pansion in terms of both product markets and labour markets.24 According to our model,
this sudden expansion in the set of economic activities or sectors available to individuals
should permit an smoother allocation of talent and, consequently, improve the operation
of ￿nancial institutions within the newly incorporated 10 countries. We let this issue
pending for future research.
24At this moment, the expansion in labour markets has been somewhat limited; as only the only EU-15
countries that have permitted unrestricted access to their labour markets have been: Ireland, United
Kingdom and Sweden.
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Bearing in mind the non-negativity constraints Ki
i ￿ 0 and qi ￿ 0, we obtain the following
￿rst order conditions (FOC):
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Where b ￿ ￿ ￿e[Si+(1￿￿)P Ki
i]. Finally, in addition to these equations, p 2 (￿;1].
First of all, notice that given the inada conditions on F(K), Ki
i > 0 must always
hold in the optimum; hence, Eq.(L.1.3) will always hold with strict equality. Secondly, in
order to ￿nd the solution of Problem (II), it is easier start solving the problem under the
(temporary) assumption that qi > 0 veri￿es in the optimum, so that Eq.(L.1.2) must also

























Consequently, equating Eq.(L.1.5) and (L.1.6), in the optimumit must be veri￿ed: F
0(Ki
i) =
￿P (1 ￿ p)





































Claim A.1.1 There exists a unique value p 2 (￿;1), such that: i) when p = p, Eq.(L.1.8)
yields qi = 0, ii) 8p < p, (L.1.8) delivers qi > 0, iii) 8p > p, (L.1.8) gives qi < 0.



















Thus, qi ? 0 () A ? B. Remember that p 2 (￿;1], and calculate the values of A and
B when p approaches its lower-bound (￿) and its upper-bound (1).




￿ > 0 A(p ! 1) = 0
B(p ! ￿) = 0 B(p ! 1) = 1
Now, bearing in mind that both A and B are continuous and di⁄erentiable all over the






















Therefore, as A(p ! ￿) > B(p ! ￿) and A(p ! 1) < B(p ! 1), being A strictly
decreasing in pi and B strictly increasing in p over the interval (￿;1); A and B must
necessarily cross each other once (and only once) at some value of p 2 (￿;1). Let￿ s denote
this crossing-point as p; so that, A(p = p) = B(p = p). Hence, for all p 2 (￿;p), A > B
must hold; and for all p 2 (p;1), B > A must be veri￿ed. ￿
Claim A.1.1 implies that, for all p ￿ p, Eq.(L.1.7) and Eq.(L.1.8) indeed yield the
optimal values of Ki
i and qi, respectively. However, according to Claim A.1.1, for all p > p
the non-negativity constraint qi ￿ 0 will be binding; consequently, we still need to ￿nd
the optimal values of Ki
i and qi when p > p.
Assume for the moment that qi = 0 is optimal 8p 2 (p;1). Then, from the FOC and
the fact that Eq.(L.1.3) must always hold with strict equality, it must be the case that:
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)e
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33To ￿nally complete the proof, we still need to show that Eq.(L.1.9) holds when we plug
Eq.(L.1.10) into it. Take the last two members of Eq.(L.1.9); apply logarithms on both
sides, replace Ki
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1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)p
1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)p
￿
< 0 8p 2 (p;1)
Hence, Eq.(L.1.11) holds for all p 2 (p;1), which completes the proof. ￿
Proof of Lemma 2. First, take any p 2 [p;1). Then, according to Lemma 1: qi = 0,
Ki
i = K > 0, and Si = wi ￿ PK. If this Type-i decided to mimic the behaviour of the
Type-j in the insurance market, then he would choose: qi = qj = 0, Ki
i = 0, and Si = wi.
Notice now that the vector [qi = 0;Ki
i = 0;Si = wi] is actually part of the feasible set in
Problem(II); furthermore, it is never an optimal choice for any p 2 [p;1). Therefore, it
must be the case that the IC stipulated in Eq.(12) does not bind for values of p 2 [p;1).













Now, take any p 2 (￿;p); FOC of Problem (II) necessarily lead to the following relation






















If the IC does not bind in equilibrium, then in the optimum it must be veri￿ed the
following condition: F 0(Ki













34Finally, from Lemma 1, if the IC does not bind in equilibrium, then Eq.(7) must hold for

















Notice that J(p) is continuous and di⁄erentiable all over the interval [￿;p]. Set p = ￿,
which leads to J(￿) = ￿
￿ > 0; therefore, the IC must bind in the vicinity of ￿. Finally,
note that @J=@p < 0 for any p 2 (￿;p), and that the IC does not bind at p = p, which
implies that J(p) < 0 must hold. As a result, there must necessarily exist some cut-o⁄
value b p 2 (￿;p); such that when p = b p : J(b p) = 0; and 8p 2 (￿; b p) : J(p) > 0, and
8p 2 (b p;p) : J(p) < 0 . ￿
Proof of Lemma 3. Take some value p￿ = p0, and denote: b q0 ￿ b q(p0) and b K0 ￿ b K(q0).
Applying logarithms to Eq.(14),
ln(￿) + ￿P b K0 + ln
 
F 0( b K0)
F 0( b K0) ￿ ￿P
!
= 0 (L.3.1)
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Eq.(13) implies d b K
db q > 0. Moreover,
F00( b K0)
F0( b K0)(F0( b K0)￿￿P ) < 0, because F
00(K) < 0 and
F 0( b K0) ￿ ￿P(1 ￿ ￿)￿1 > ￿P. As a consequence, for Eq.(L.3.2) to hold,
db q
dp = 0 must
necessarily be true for any value of p￿ = p0. ￿
Proof of Proposition 2. Omitted.
Proof of Lemma 4. Take some site h = 2 At￿1, and assume in period t innovator h
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h = ￿￿1. Finally, P￿
h = ￿￿1 represents a global maximum of ￿, since
￿00(Ph) < 0 whenever ￿0(Ph) ￿ 0. ￿
35Proof of Proposition 4.
(i) First, notice that, by assumption in Section 4.1, ￿￿











￿ 1 > ￿(P ￿ 1)K (p
￿;P) ￿ 1 8P >1; (P.4.1)
where K (p￿;P) is given by Eq.(19), then: ￿￿
FI > ￿￿
AI. Eq.(P.4.1) leads to:
1 >
1 ￿ b p(P)
1 ￿ ￿
(P.4.2)
And Eq.(P.4.2) always holds, since b p(P) > ￿ for all P >1.25 ￿
(ii) PROOF INCOMPLETE
Proof of Proposition 5. Given ￿ (P￿(e n)￿1)K￿(1￿(1￿￿)e n;P￿(e n)) = 1, if n0 > e n; then,
equilibrium in t = 1 is unique, and veri￿es ￿￿
1 = 1. As a result Eq.(22) implies n1 > n0 > e n;
which, in turn, means that ￿￿
2 = 1. Repeating this reasoning ad in￿nitum, we can deduce
that for any economy such that n0 > e n, the sequence f￿￿
1 = 1;￿￿
2 = 1;:::;￿￿
1 = 1g always
holds in a dynamic equilibrium. This means Eq.(22) turns into:
nt = (1 ￿ ￿)nt￿1 + ￿ (P.5.1)
Finally, Eq.(P.5.1) provides a di⁄erence equation that converges monotonically to
n1 = 1. ￿
25More precisely, b p(P) is strictly decreasing in P and lim
P!1
b p(P) = ￿.
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